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THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT UNDER
THE WAGNER ACT: I
HEINRICH HOENIGERt
I. Individual Employment Contract and Individual BargainEN the March issue of the Harvard Law Review Professor Chester
Ward in his article "The Mechanics of Collective Bargaining" states:
"The impact of the command to bargain collectively upon the privilege of the
employers to make individual contracts of employment with their employees
is presently incalculable. Certain it is, however, that this is one of the gravest
problems arising under the Act. . .. "I
This intricate problem can scarcely be brought to a closer solution with-
out venturing a wider and more comprehensive attack. This article ven-
tures such an attack and, therefore, tries to outline ideas which may
serve to disentangle this rather complex confusion. Such a tentative
analysis requires, at its outset, clarification of the term: "individual
contract of employment", for this term has up to now not always been
used in only one sense. At least two connotations of this term can
clearly be distinguished. Either of them entails quite different problems.
On the one hand, the term denotes nothing else than the initial and
simple contract of hiring without any reference to employment conditions.
On the other hand, the term "individual employment contract" in addi-
tion to the contract of hiring refers to the "individual bargain" over
employment conditions and is used in antithesis to "collective bargain-
ing".2 For reasons of expediency these two connotations shall be dis-
cussed in reversed order, i.e., the first one under B, and the second
under A.
A. In the abovementioned article Professor Ward uses the term
"individual contract of employment" in the second sense, i.e., as an
equivalent to "individual bargain", when he discusses the NLRB's deci-
sions in Hanson-Whitney Machine Co.,3 and Schierbrock Motors.4 In
both cases the employer entered into a bargain with individual employees
instead of bargaining with the union. In these decisions the NLRB
t Assistant Professor, Fordham University, Graduate School.
It is my privilege to express my gratitude to the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation
which enabled me to secure the assistance of Dr. Paul Fischer. I wish to acknowledge
his valuable collaboration in completing this comprehensive survey.
1. 53 HARv. L. REv. (1940) 754, 787.
2. CoAiaoNs AND ANDREWS, P, INcYPES or LABoR LEGIsLATiox (4th ed. 1936) 372.
3. 8 N.L.R.B. 153 (1938).
4. 15 N.L.R.B. 1109 (1939).
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ordered the employers-to bargain collectively, and such orders have left
scarcely any opportunity for individual bargaining. The same restrictive
opinion is expressed by Commons and Andrews:
"Where a collective bargain is made, each individual worker is employed on
the terms contained in the bargain. He virtually makes no individual bargain
at all.. .. 5
and by Taylor:
"Obviously . . . there can be but little individual bargaining." 6
If there are opportunities left for the making of an individual bargain,
they must be exceptions to the general rule.
Hence the first problem arises: Under the system of collective bar-
gaining governed by the Wagner Act, what remains of the individual
bargain? In'what exceptional cases does individual bargaining still exist?
This was the question that Professor Ward made the subject of his
investigation. Not satisfied with the Board's view he contrasted it with
the Supreme Court's dictum in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.:
"The Act does not compel agreement between employers and employees. It
does not compel any agreement whatever." 7
But, if the Act does not compel collective agreements, it at least expects
such agreements as the usual outcome of real negotiations in good faith.
To obtain this result the statute "does command those preliminary steps
without which no agreements can be reached."8 A close analysis of the
Court's decision leaves no doubt that there exists no alternative for the
employer, either to.bargain collectively' or to conclude individual bar-
gains. Therefore, the conclusion which was reached by the NLRB in
5. Comoxzos Am A DnEws, op. cit. supra note 2 at 372.
"When the discussion is between the employer or his representative and a single wage-
earner, and is concerned exclusively with that individual wage-earner's contract, the process
is said to be individual bargaining." Fitch, The Causes of Industrial Unrest (1924) 149
HA PER's 101, 103.
6. TAYLOR, LABOR PROBLEmS AND LABOR LAW (1938) 182.
7. 301 U. S. 1, 45 (1937).
8. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515 (1937). Restated in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 44 (1937): "We said that the obligation to
treat with the true representative was exclusive and hence imposed the negative duty to
treat with no other", and applied to NLRA § 9 (a), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 (a).
"It is true that the act does not require the parties to agree but merely to negotiate with
each other; but it is based upon the idea that negotiations honestly entered into will gen-
erally result in the settlement of differences, and commands negotiations for that reason.
Statistics show the reasonableness of the hope upon which it proceeds." Jeffrey-De Witt
Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91 F. (2d) 134, 139 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
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Stolle Corp.,9 and Schierbrock Motors, and which was questioned by
Professor Ward is correct. In these cases it was held that the right to
make individual contracts has not been held by the Supreme Court to
be permissible alternative to the obligation of collective bargaining when
the employees have, in accordance with the Act, selected representatives
therefor. The duty to bargain collectively stands as the general rule.
Only if the requirements of collective bargaining are not present, the
NLRB does not exclude individual bargaining. Professor Ward has
mentioned such an exceptional case to be "when a majority had not
designated a collective agent." In his opinion it is, however, arguable
whether the Supreme Court refers only to such exceptional instances
when stating in the Jones & Laughlin case:
"It (the Act) does not prevent the employer 'from refusing to make a collective
contract and hiring individuals on whatever terms' the employer 'may by
unilateral action determine' ".1o
The Supreme Court has, however, clarified its opinion in more recent
decisions, particularly in National Licorice Co. v. NLRB." It cannot
be doubted any longer that the Supreme Court has actually excluded any
alternative of bargaining individually when the requirements of collective
bargaining are present. In other words, individual bargains which do
not violate the NLRA can be had only in exceptional instances. Our
first problem, to be discussed in Section II of this article, is therefore
first to canvass these exceptional cases, and secondly to analyse the
implications of individual bargains made in violation of the NLRA.
B. The second problem concerning the employer's privilege to make
individual contracts with his employees refers to the simple and initial
contract of hiring and its dissolution through discharge. The Supreme
Court considered this entirely different question in the same paragraph
of the Jones & Laughlin decision and in close connection with the afore-
mentioned sentences of the opinion. There it was said:
"The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select its employees or to discharge them."' 2
Evidently the right to select and to discharge individual employees,
recognized by the decision, must have a contractual source. Since the
Jones & Laughlin case stated that the Wagner Act, which aims to facil-
9. 13 N.L.R.B. 370 (1939). See NLRB v. Lightner Publishing Corp. of Illinois, 113
F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Jahn & Ollier Engraving Co., 24 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (1940).
10. 301 U. S. 1, 45 (1937).
11. 309 U. S. 350 (1940): Section II, 2 infra.
12. 301 U. S. 1, 45 (1937).
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itate collective agreements, "does not interfere" with this right, this
source must exist separately from any collective agreement. Further,
since the right is said to exist at the same time when the general employer-
employee relations are governed by the full sweep of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, this latter agreement must be different from the indi-
vidual bargain. 3 But the right of the employer to select and to discharge
applies to the individual employee. Therefore its source must be a con-
tract which exists solely between the individual employee and the em-
ployer, to wit: the individual employment contract. While the collective
agreement is generally laid down in a written contract, the individual
employment contract is often a parol contract. 4
This duality, i.e. the fact that such an individual employment contract
exists independently from the collective agreement, is recognized not
only by the Supreme Court but also by a host of observers. 5 The terms
of the collective agreement apply only to persons integrated into the
employer's business organization,"0 i.e. to persons hired by means of an
individual employment contract. The contract of hiring establishes the
employer-employee relation or the employee status. When, in the regular
case, almost all the employment conditions are determined by the collec-
tive agreement, what is the significance of the individual contract of
13. However, the individual employment contract might coincide with the individual
bargain in the exceptional cases where the latter is still permissible. Section I, infra.
Prof. Ward uses the terms individual bargain and individual contract of employment inter-
changeably. In this article, "collective bargaining," the procedure, and "collective agree-
ment," its result, form one pair of terms; "individual bargaining", and "individual bar-
gain," the other pair.
14. "When the collective agreement, tacitly or expressly, is taken as supplying any or
all of the terms of the service of a particular employee, it still is not the contract, but
only a standard, to which the parties have referred in making their parol contract."
Illinois Central Railroad v. Moore, 2 Labor Cases 845 (C. C. A. 5h, 1940).
15. Hamilton, Individual Rights Arising from Collective Labor Contracts (1938) 3 Mo.
L. REv. 252; Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1924) 10 ST. Louis
L. REV. 1; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 HAv. L. REv.
572; Anderson, Collective Bargaining Agreements (1936) 15 ORE. L. Rav. 229; Theories of
Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements (1932) 41 YAIL L. REV. 1221. A very sig-'
nificant statement on this subject was made by Hamilton, Collective Bargaining (1935) 3
ENC C LOPaEDIA O THE SocIAl, SciENcEs 628, 629: "The process of collective bargaining
results, not in a labor contract, but in a trade agreement. This imposes no obligation
upon the employer to offer or upon the laborers to accept work; ...It is nothing more
than a statement of the conditions upon which such work as is offered and accepted is to
be done. The cantract of employment is still between the individual employer and the in-
dividual employee, . . . " (Italics supplied.)
16. This principle was outlined by the writer of this article in Hoeniger, Labor Law-
An Instrument for Social Peace and Progress (1940) FoRDnAm UNIv. SOCIAL STIDIEs 13.
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hiring? From the foregoing this conclusion can be drawn: It refers to
the employer's right to select his employees. And by implication the
second correlative right to discharge can be added. This was the solution
seemingly suggested by the Supreme Court in the Jones & Laughlin case
and confirmed by the Court in many instances.17
The right to select and to discharge, to hire and to fire,'8 are creations
of the individual employment contract, of the contract of hiring. But
are these rights not subject to restrictions imposed either by collective
agreements, i.e. agreements entered into voluntarily or by law, partic-
ularly by the provisions of the Wagner Act? This is the second main
problem this article ventures to disentangle.
Briefly to restate the above problem: Collective bargaining under the
NLRA exerts a strong influence upon individual bargaining as well as
upon the rights to select and to discharge created by the contract of
hiring. To measure the extent of this influence, it is necessary to inquire:
1. To what extent is there still a possibility for individual bargaining
under the Wagner Act? And what are the legal implications of individual
bargains which violate the NLRA?
2. To what extent does the prevailing system of collective bargaining
under the Wagner Act restrict the right to select and to discharge?
To answer the second question it will be necessary to analyze the
effect of the individual employment contract which creates, or by its
dissolution terminates, the employee status. Then it may be possible to
correlate these types of the status to various restrictions on the right
to create or destroy it. In this way we may succeed, at least tentatively,
in building up a systematic structure of the employee status.'9
II. The Individual Bargain
In the foregoing section the distinction was made between collective
bargaining and individual bargaining. If rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment and conditions of employment were agreed upon by the
employer or an association of employers and the representative of a
unit of employees, a collective bargain would exist. On the other hand
if no collective bargain were made and if the individual employee and
17. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301
U. S. 103 (1937). For the right to discharge, see NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corpora-
tion, 306 U. S. 240 (1939).
18. Among the rights which remain with the management under a collective agreement
are (1) selecting new employees, (2) determining who shall be dropped. Bergen, Manage-
ment Prerogatives (1940) 53 HARv. Bus. Rxv. 277.
19. See Sections Ill-V infra.
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the employer were haggling over the terms of employment, an individual
bargain might result from the negotiations.
But fixing of employment conditions itself under either of these
methods does not create the employer-employee relation. The collective
agreement
"... establishes no concrete contract between the employer and any employee.
No one is bound thereby to serve, and the employer is not bound to hire any
particular person. It is only an agreement as to the terms on which contracts
of employment may be satisfactorily made and carried out."
2 0
Therefore, to bring about this "concrete contract between employer and
any employee", to create the employee status, the individual employee
must be hired by an individual employment contract. Since individual
bargaining results but in the fixing of employment conditions individually,
the same initial element of an individual employment contract must be
added: the man must be hired.
Even in the case of an individual bargain, the actual employment
relation is based upon two contractual elements, the contract of hiring
and the individual bargain over employment conditions. Both these
contracts are. concluded between the very same parties. Hence it is
possible, and often occurs, that these two transactions coincide. Then
they appear to be but one transaction, that of hiring and fixing the
employment conditions at the same time. But this is not necessarily so.
The employee may have been hired years ago. His employment condi-
tions may have been fixed by a collective agreement, which has just
expired. A new collective agreement has not yet been reached, despite
negotiations in good faith.21 For the time being the employment con-
ditions of the employee may be fixed through an individual bargain. In
such a case the individual bargain is clearly distinct from the contract
of hiring which created his employee status years ago.
The collective agreement provides standards for the employment con-
ditions. Its effect is, therefore, that all employees of the unit in question
are employed under the very same terms. An equiponderant effect may
be obtained through the conclusion of several individual bargains which
follow a pattern and show identical conditions of employment. Such
21model or pattern-contracts are usually provided by the employer, or.
20. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902, 903 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). (Italics
inserted.)
21. Notes 34 and 35 infra. S
22. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917); Phillips Petroleum
Company, 23 N.L.R.B. No. 74 (1940).
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by the employers' associations.23 Such a plurality of individual pattern-
contracts is clearly distinct from a collective agreement which is to be
concluded between the employer and the union representing the bargain-
ing unit of the employees.
Prior to the enactment of the Wagner Act individual bargaining held
a dominant position in the establishment of employment relations.
According to the United States Department of Labor,2" 76.5% out of
14,825 establishments investigated, employing 1,935,673 workers, used
this device to deal with their employees. The picture changed completely
since the NLRA was enacted, especially since its constitutionality was
upheld by the Supreme Court. 5 But individual bargaining is still impor-
tant in the following strata not reached by the NLRA.
A. The NLRA only applies to employments affecting interstate com-
merce. Therefore a gap had to be left open in the realm of intrastate
commerce. This gap was in a few cases closed by state statutes, the
so-called "little Wagner Acts."26
B. Further, the Act does not apply to
"any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service
of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse."2 7
Neither does it apply to
"employees of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof." 28
Our investigation, however, is not concerned with the cases not within,
or exempt from, the Wagner Act or similar state statutes. The question
under consideration is whether within the scope of the statutes ordering
23. Atlas Bag & Burlap Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 292 (1936); National Licorice Co., 7 N.L.R.B.
537, 309 U. S. 350 (1940); American Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 629 (1940).
24. WATIM-S AND DODD, MANAGMENT OF LABOR RELATIONS p. 681; (1935) 38 MoNTHLY
LABOR REv., statistics.
25. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U. S. 103 (1937); NLRB'v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49 (1937);
NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58 (1937); Washington, Virginia
and Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 142 (1937).
26. JAEGER, CAsES AND STATUTFS ON LABOR LAW (1939) 1068, lists: Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia and Wisconsin. In addition
the concept of "affecting interstate commerce" has been constantly stretched by the Supreme
Court. See RosEmxARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR POlicz 409.
27. NLRA § 2 (3), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (3).
28. NLRA § 2 (2), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (2). To list the exemption of railway em-
ployment contracts from the NLRA could be dispensed with, since those contracts are
subject to the Railway Labor Act § 2 (1), 45 U. S. C. A. § 152 (1), which establishes a
duty to bargain collectively similar to that in NLRA § 8 (5), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (5).
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the employers to bargain collectively there is still an opportunity for
individual bargaining.
The Wagner Act states explicitly that protection by law of the right
of employees to bargain collectively
"safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes
the flow of commerce by removing -certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest.12
9
The "refusal to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees""0 constitutes an unfair labor practice by the employer. Or,
to state it in the positive form: Upon him rests the duty to bargain
collectively in good faith.3 ' If he complies with this duty, the expected
result will be a collective agreement. In the case which the Wagner Act32
attempts to make the normal one, the relationship will be the product
of two factors: (a) the collective agreement, and (b) the individual
employment contract. These two factors thus create the regular and
perfect employee status. Perfect, because the parties have met the re-
quirements of the Wagner Act completely. The desired procedure, col-
lective bargaining, was elected by the parties. It was successful. Nothing
remains to be done.
Two other cases are to be discussed. In both of them the regular
employee status is established through individual contracts of hiring.
The status is however not perfect because, contrary to the goal of the
Wagner Act, the employment conditions are not determined through
collective bargaining, but through individual bargains. Only in excep-
tional cases such individual bargains, although not in conformity with
the tendency of the Wagner Act, may not violate its provisions and,
therefore, be tolerated. These exceptions are dealt with under subsection
2. Generally, individual bargains are not only contrary to the policy of
the NLRA but violate its provisions. The implication.s of these later cases
are discussed under subsection 2.
1. There are two main instances33 of exceptional cases where indi-
29. NLRA § 1, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U. S. 1 (1936); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292 (1938);
NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1938); Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300
U. S. 575 (1936); NLRB v. Remington Rand Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
30. NLRA § 8 (5), 29 U. S. C. A. § 8 (5).
31. S. L. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714, 717 (1936).
32. "The Act contemplates the making of contracts with labor organizations. This is
the manifest objective in providing for collective bargaining." Consolidated Edison v.
NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 236 (1938).
33. Garrison, Government & Labor: The Latest Phase (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 897.
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vidual bargains do not violate the provisions of the Wagner Act. Both
of them have found recognition in litigation. The first exception takes
place when the duty to bargain collectively has ceased to exist or is
suspended, the second when not all premises of this duty exist.
a. The employer is not required to continue to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees when negotiations already have
indicated that their continuation would be futile. In In re Jeffrey-
DeWitt84 the Board dealt with the case where an impasse in negotiations
had been reached between the employer and its employees. There the
principle was established that in such a case the employer may be justified
in refusing to meet further with the employees for the reason that no
new agreement is possible. The duty of the employer to bargain has
been suspended for the duration of the deadlock. 5 This temporary
phenomenon contravenes so seriously the tendency of the NLRA thai
the Board has demonstrated itself to be very reluctant to recognize the
suspension of the duty to bargain collectively.
"Every avenue and possibility of negotiation must be exhausted, before it
should be admitted that an irreconcilable difference creating an impasse has
been reached."8 6
As soon as a new avenue to successful bargaining is opened and the
Dean Garrison's proposal to relieve the Board of the duty to determine the appropriate
bargaining unit in union rivalry cases would lead to another case where the duty to bargain
collectively would be suspended. Another type of situation is suggested in Aronsson Printing
Co., 13 N.L.R.B.799 (1b39), where the employer's refusal to sign "standard" union -contracts
until the union should have secured such contracts with employer's principal competitors was
held justified. In the majority of cases the factor of competition was not recognized as a
reason for not bargaining collectively. J. Chester & Sons Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1 (1939);
American Range Lines, 13 N.L.R.B. 139 (1939); Geo. P. Pilling & Son Co., 16 N.L.R.B.
650 (1939); Harbor Boat Building Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 349 (1936); Harry Schwartz Yarn
Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1139 (1939). These cases fall under the general'principle that the em-
ployer's financial condition does not absolve him from his duty to negotiate with the
representatives of the employees. Pittsburg Metallurgical Co. Inc., 20 N.L.R.B. No. 103
(1940); Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 N.LLR.B. 837 (1936); Atlas Bag & Burlap Co. Inc.,
1 N.L.R.B. 292 (1936); Lane Cotton Mills Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 952 (1938); Holston Mfg.
Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 783 (1939).
34. Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936).
35. Ibid.; Trenton Garment Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1938); NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co.,
306 U. S. 332 (1939); Seas Shipping Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 757 (1938); John Minder & Son,
6 N.L.R.B. 764 (1938); Aluminum Products Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 1219 (1938); Cullon v.
Ghertner, 14 N.L.R.B. 21 (1939); Essex Wire Corp., 19 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1940); Reed &
Prince Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 944 (1939); Republic Creosoting Co., 19 NL.R.B. No. 30
(1940). Rosm=A-, op. cit. supra note 26 at 217.
36. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939).
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situation changes, a new cause for further negotiation is created.3 7 The
duty to bargain has not ceased permanently but only for the time being.3
It was only temporarily inoperative. During this suspension in negotia-
tions caused by a deadlock, the employer who is only temporarily re-
lieved from the duty to bargain collectively may bargain individually
with his employees.39 His right to enter into individual bargains and
employment contracts exists as long as the impasse lasts provided only
that there is no intention to evade or obstruct collective bargaining.40
And, as mentioned above, it is terminated by any change in the situation
which causes collective bargaining to be resumed. The tendency of the
NLRA is to restore the duty to bargain collectively as soon as possible.
As soon as "new issues" are introduced, 1 for instance the intervention
of conciiators, 42. then there revives the employer's duty to meet with the
representatives of the employees in order to resume negotiations.3 This
duty to reenter into negotiations upon new contingencies remains alive
as long as a collective agreement has not been reached. Such an agree-
ment, if finally achieved, could then replace the individual bargains. In
other words: Such individual bargains which are permitted for the time
being are intended to be as shortlived as possible.
b. The second group of exceptional cases arises through such inci-
dents as the lack of a majority union. As long as no majority has
emerged, there can not be a duty on the part of the employer to deal
37. S. L. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714 (1936).
38. RosENPARB, op. cit. supra note 26 at 218.
39. RosEN=A, op. cit. supra note 26 at 230, refuses to grant the employer this right.
He denies that the impasse constitutes an exception of the employer's duty to bargain with
the represeptatives of an existing majority. But he must admit that the Supreme Court
and the Board have repeatedly drawn this conclusion and recognized the employer's right
to bargain individually when a definite impasse has been reached. See: NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939) (four individual bargains with four foremen upon a new and dif-
ferent basis were considered valid); Legil-Fencil Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 988 (1938).
40. Chicago Apparatus Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1939); Chesapeake Shoe Mfg. Co., 12
N.L.R.B. 832 (1939) (granting to individual employees terms which were refused to the
Union's representatives during the negotiation); Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.,
1 N.L.R.B. 181 (1936) (negotiating with individual employees in spite of the fact that
representatives were designated); Remington Rand Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626 (1937); Timken
Silent Automatic' Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 335 (1936); Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B.
618 (1936); Inland Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. 783 (1938); Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 4 NL.R.B.
679 (1937).
41. S. L. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714 (1936).
42. Jeffrey-De Witt Insulator Co., I N.L.R.B. 618 (1936).
43. In NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939), the Supreme Court has clearly
defined and limited the duties of the employer to resume negotiations in case of an im-
passe.
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with the representatives chosen by the majority. This was the ruling in
Mooresville Cotton Mills," and has been affirmed in many subsequent
cases. 45 However, the employer's obligation to bargain collectively in-
cludes his duty to cooperate to a reasonable extent in an inquiry as to a
union's claim to have been designated as the exclusive representative by
the majority of employees. Refusal to cooperate in ascertaining the
presuppositions of collective bargaining is equivalent to refusal to bargain
collectively.46
It is of no importance whatever circumstances cause the absence of
any presuppositions for collective bargaining. The cause may be:
(1) that all the employees or a majority of them simply refuse to join
any union, or to select and designate bargaining representatives, 47
(2) that the majority is not discernible by the means provided by
statute,48 or
(3) that a previously existent majority was lost without unlawful inter-
ference by the employer, and no new majority has yet been formed.49
Since in all these cases the employer is under no duty to bargain collec-
tively, he is free to enter into individual contracts. But this state of
44. Mooresville Cotton Mill, 2 N.L.R.B. 952 (1937).
45. Wallace Mfg. Co. Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1937); Titan Metal Mfg. Co., 5 N.L.R.B.
577 (1938); M. Lowenstein & Sons, 6 N.L.R.B. 216 (1938); Falk Corp., 6 N.L.R.B. 654
(1938); Grace Corp., 7 N.L.R.B. 766 (1938); Pure Oil Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 207 (1938);
Shellabarger Grain Products Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 336 (1938); Altorfer Bros. Co., 5 N.L.R.B.
713 (1938); Williams Mfg. Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 135 (1938); Republic Creosoting Co., 19
N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1940); Baumann Bros. Furniture Mfg. Co., 18 N.L.R.B. No. 91 (1939)
(union represented majority, but not in all the appropriate bargaining units); Fox-Coffey-
Edge Millinery Co., 20 N.L.R.B. No. 66 (1940).
46. Burnside Steel Founding Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 714 (1938); Serrick Corp., 8 N.L.R.B.
621 (1938).
47. Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938); Swing v. A. F. of L., 298 Ill. App.
63, 18 N. E. (2d) 258 (1938); Fur Workers Union (C.I.O.) v. Fur Workers Union (A. F.
of L.) & H. Zerkin & Sons Inc., 105 F. (2d) 1 (App. D. C. 1939); Southwestern Engineer-
ing Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 104 (1939).
48. Peninsula & Occidental S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938)
(either during the run-off election or when the Board refuses to designate the bargaining
agency).
49. Not even the order of the Board to bargain collectively with a specific union bestows
upon the union involved a perpetual tenure as bargaining representative. The duty to
bargain collectively ceases when the union loses the majority of the employees. However,
"the loss of majority must be due to forces outside of unfair labor practice of the em-
ployer". RosErFARB, op. cit. supra note 26 at 204, 586; Kiddie Kover Mfg. Co., 6 N.L.R.B.
355 (1938); Bradford Dyeing Association, 4 N.L.R.B. 604 (1937). Otherwise, the union
which lost its majority through unfair labor practice of the employer is still empowered to
represent the employees under the doctrine of "presumptive authority." Reading Batteries,
19 N.L.R.B. No. 29 (1940).
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affairs does not satisfy the goal of the Wagner Act. It will exist only
temporarily." When a majority is formed or ascertained, then the duty
to bargain collectively will become operative again" and a collective
agreement is expected to replace the individual bargains. Again the
transitory character of these individual bargains is obvious.
The other problems regarding individual bargains can only be touched
upon in this connection under later sections. Their full exposition would
require a thorough discussion of the nature of the collective agreement.
The two cases mentioned above represent individual bargains to
be concluded in the absence of and instead of a collective agreement.
Is it possible to enter into individual bargains in addition to a collective
agreement? Commons and Andrews assert that the individual employee
"... virtually makes no individual bargain at all unless through individual
bargaining he is able to secure better terms than those contained in the col-
lective bargain."5' 2
Such a general solution is questionable in the absence of any established
principle or positive statutory provision to this effect in American labor
lawY5 The question still remains unsettled, whether employment condi-
tions fixed through collective agreements could be generally altered by
concurrent or subsequent individual contracts which secure better terms
of employment. If the data be reversed the question would be whether
the collectively bargained standards .could be lowered by individual
contracts. There seems to be very little doubt that the answer to this
question is in the negative. For, collective agreements purport at least
to secure minimum standards which can not be lowered by individual
contracts.54
Repeatedly it has been pointed out that individual bargains are only
50. This is obvious in cases (2) and (3). In case (1) the unions will put pressure
upon employer and employee who refuse to create the prerequisite for collective bargain-
ig. The courts have continuously refused to enjoin unions from aggressive but legal actions
to bring about unionization. The lack of majority in this type of case is bound to be
temporary only. See cases cited in note 29.
51. The duty was suspended in cases (2) and (3), latent in case (1).
52. Comroxs Mm ANrnRws, op. cit. supra note 2 at 372. There is no established prece-
dent to this effect as far as the author could discover.
53. There is no established precedent to this effect. A dictun in Illinois Central R.R.
Co. v. Moore, 2 Labor Cases 845 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), tends to open the possibility for
concluding such bargains without any restrictions in regard to their contents. The Circuit
Court said: "But ordinarily there is nothing to prevent a special agreement." Thereby
even the possibility to conclude bargains containing less favorable conditions than those
fixed by the collective agreement is left open. Notes 54 and 86 infra.
54. McNeill v. Hacker, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 432 (City Ct. 1940). Note 86 infra.
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of a temporary nature. In the regular course, they are to be followed by
collective agreements. Hence, in these cases the question arises, how
do such subsequent collective agreements affect the individual bargains
previously entered into without violation of the law? Collective agree-
ments are intended to fix employment conditions generally. Therefore,
it seems to be consistent that these generally established conditions are
to have a modifying effect upon the prior individual bargains. This is
most probably true whenever better conditions are arrived at through a
collective bargain. Do, however, less favorable conditions of a subse-
quent collective agreement displace better ones which were agreed upon
in previous individual contracts? This question55 has never been dis-
cussed up to now in so far as the writer is aware. As stated above, it can
not be answered definitely in the limits of this article. However, a few
suggestive considerations may be sketched. A collective agreement may
be changed through a subsequent agreement with the union concerned
even if this latter agreement contains less favorable conditions.5 6 More-
over, an individual contract between employer and employee was held
to be "superseded" by a contract between an association of employers
and a union. 7 These two facts seem to indicate a trend toward the
opinion that subsequent collective agreements replace previous bargains
either collectively or individually entered into, even if they lower the
previously bargained conditions. Such an opinion seems to be not only
justifiable but indispensable; else, it would not be possible to adapt
terms of employment to economic conditions which have turned out to
become worse.
In conclusion it may be said that individual bargains, which in excep-
tional cases may be validly entered into for the time being, are expected
to be replaced as soon as possible through collective agreements. The
question remains whether such collective agreements supersede previous
individual bargains and whether individual bargains may be concluded
in addition to collective agreements and modifying their conditions.
These questions can be solved only in connection with a full discussion
of the theory of collective agreements.5"
55. This question is touched upon in Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Moore, 2 Labor
Cases 845 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), but not discussed in a general way. Moreover, this prob-
lem must not be confused with the reverse question whether collectively bargained terms
of employment could be lowered through individual bargains. See note 54 supra, and
note 86 infra.
56. Hamilton, Individual Rights in Labor Contracts (1938) 3 Mo. L. Rnv. 252, 268.
57. Individual Damp Wash Laundry Co. v. Meyers, 10 Ohio 0. 517 (1938).
58. See note 86 infra.
[Vol. 10
1941] THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT 27
2. The second main problem refers to individual bargains which are
not only contrary to the policy of the Wagner Act, but violate its pro-
visions. The attempt to fix employment conditions through individual
bargains is one of the persistently used means to evade and obstruct the
duty to bargain collectively. Numerous are the cases in which the 'Courts
as well as the Board branded these attempts as unfair labor practices. 9
Particularly individual employment contracts imposing upon the em-
ployee the obligation not to ask for collective bargaining and to refrain
from strikes60 were considered similar to yellow dog contracts.' The
most recent device of this kind is to be found in the "Balleisen formula".62
This formula provides for a pattern-contract which is to be executed
between the employer and each workman individually and not as a
collective agreement with representatives of the employees.
59. Sands Mfg. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 546 (1936); Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.,
1 N.L.R.B. 181 (1936); Timken Silent Automatic Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 335 (1936); Jeffery-
De Witt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936); Remington Rand Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 626
(1937); Inland Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. 783 (1938); Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 679
(1937); Atlas Bag & Burlap Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 292 (1936); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 12
N.L.R.B. 79 (1939); Stolle Corp., 13 N.L.R.B. 370 (1939); Jahn & Ollier Engraving Co., 24
N.L.R.B. No. 94 (1940); The Jacob Bros. Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 620 (1938); National Meter Co.,
11 N.L.R.B. 320 (1939); Carlisle Lumber Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 248 (1936); Panther-Panco Rub-
ber Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 1261 (1939).
Individual bargains which involve unfair labor practice have been held to be void as
against the public policy of the NLRA entirely or partly. McKay v. Retail Automobile
Salesmen's Union, 89 P. (2d) 426, 429 (1939), rehearing denied 90 P. (2d) 113 (1939).
On the other hand only those parts of the individual bargains which were considered un-
lawful have been held subject to restraint (if not, then adoption of individual contracts
by company union would make the total agreement unlawful), Phillips Petroleum Co., 23
N.L.R.B. No. 74 (1940).
60. Not through individual contracts, but only through collective agreement can the
right to strike be renounced for the period of this agreement. See Douglas Aircraft Co.
Inc., 18 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1939).
"The limitation (upon the right to sfrike) may be unobjectionable when reached as a
result of collective bargaining with the representatives of the employees in an appropriate
unit; . . . But imposition of such a limitation upon the individual employee may consti-
tute not only a form of coercion resulting from the inequality of bargaining position,
but also an obstruction, at the outset, to the development of effective organization, con-
certed activity, and collective bargaining." Arcade-Sunshine Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 259, 264
(1939). See also author's forthcoming article, Social Peace and National Defense, to appear
in THouGHT, March 1941.
61. These were branded as yellow-dog contracts in Atlas Bag & Burlap Co. Inc., 1
N.L.R.B. 292 (1936); Hopwood Retinning Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 922 (1938); American Mfg.
Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 443 (1938); National Licorice Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 537 (1938).
62. "An officer of petitioner admitted that he had consulted with the Brooklyn Chamber
of Commerce in forming the contracts. The contracts involved here follow the 'Balleisen
formula', said to be devised by L. L. Balleisen, Industrial Secretary of the Chamber."
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350, 354 (1940), note 1.
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"The benefits of the contract were limited to those employees who signed.
In return the signers relinquished the right to strike, the right to demand a
closed shop or signed agreement with any union."6
These two sentences mark the most significant contents of the Balleisen
formtla. This formula does not explicitly interdict employees from join-
ing any union of their own choosing. It deprives them, however, of the
right to demand a union contract. This actually amounts to a waiver
of the right to bargain collectively.64 Moreover, the Balleisen formula
provides for arbitration as to rate of wages and the number of regular
hours of employment per week, but explicitly states that the "question
as to the propriety of an employee's discharge is in no event to be one
for arbitration or mediation." "The effect of this clause was to discour-
age, if not forbid any presentation of the discharged employee's griev-
ances to appellant through a labor organization or chosen representatives,
or in any way except personally."
There can be no doubt that the Balleisen contracts violate the NLRA
in two respects: through restraint and coercion of the employee's right
to self-organization as well as through refusal to bargain collectively.
The difficulty in the National Licorice Co. v. NLRB case arose from a
procedural angle. The Board ordered the employer to post notices to
announce that the contracts with the employees were "void and of no
effect." The employees were not parties to the suit. "It is elementary,"
the Supreme Court states "that it is not within the power of any tribunal
to make a binding adjudication of the rights in personam of parties not
brought before it by due process of law."" Moreover, the NLRA con-
templates no more than the protection of the public rights which it
creates. The Board's order which is directed solely to the employer is
ineffective to determine any private rights of the employees "and leaves
them free to assert such legal rights as they may have acquired under
their contracts." For these reasons, the Supreme Court modified the
Board's order so that it would more accurately represent the affirmative
action of the Board and that misinterpretations of its action might be
avoided. By this modified order the employer was compelled to
announce:
"that the individual contracts of employment entered into between the
respondent and some of its employees were made by the respondent in vio-
63. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350, 355 (1940) ; Jahn & Oilier Engraving
Co., 24 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (1940).
64. The right to bargain collectively is based on public law. It cannot be stipulated
away. Kollefer Mfg. Corp., 22 N.L.R.B. No. 22 (1940).
65. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350, 362 (1940).
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lation of the National Labor Relations Act, and that the respondent will no
longer offer, solicit, enter into, continue, enforce or attempt to enforce such
contract with the employees, but this without prejudice to the assertion by
the employees of any legal rights they may have acquired under such con-
tracts.""'
It would be possible to argue that this amounts to preserving for em-
ployees their rights under the individual contracts, while the employer is
precluded by the Board's order from taking any benefit of such individual
contracts. Thus, individual bargains and contracts entered into through
unfair labor practice of the employer would work only for the benefit of
the employees concerned and would burden only the employer. They
would represent lop-sided contracts. But the nature of these contracts
remains still dubious because the Supreme Court has pointed out:
"It [the Board's order] does not foreclose the employees from taking any
action to secure an adjudication upon the contracts, nor prejudge their rights
in the event of such adjudication. We do not now consider their nature and
extent. It is sufficient to say here that it will not be open to any tribunal to
compel the employer to perform the acts, which, though he has bound himself
by contract to do them, would violate the Board's order or be inconsistent
with any part of it."167
In this way, the question of the private rights which the employees can
assert under their individual bargains is still left open, while the rights
of the employer are destroyed. Whatever might be the fate of the indi-
vidual bargain, fixing the employment conditions, the employee retains
his employee status. He was hired and remains so. The contract of
hiring is not affected by the defects involved in the individual bargain
over employment conditions. These individually bargained terms are
certainly ineffective in so far as they violate the NLRA. Whether the
other parts of these terms remain valid or not is uncertain at least for
the time being.
It is obvious that such an employee status is defective. Uncertainty
reigns as to what are the employment conditions. Obvious violations of
the NLRA constitute the defects which must be remedied through nego-
tiations in compliance with the Act, i.e. through collective bargaining in
good faith. The defective individual bargains entail in all probability a
one-sided burden upon the employer. This in turn will certainly induce
the employer to free himself from this lop-sided situation by every pos-
sible effort to reach a collective agreement. Thus, in all probability,
66. Id. at 367.
67. Id. at 365.
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defective individual bargains will soon be replaced through collective
agreements.
In conclusion it can be said that the individual bargains, whether
permitted by the NLRA in exceptional cases or violating its provisions,
are not intended to last, but to be replaced through collective agreements.
Our attempt to answer the first question raised above in Section I, A,
namely, to outline the extent of individual bargains under the Wagner
Act, can now be summarized in a graph:
Individual Bargain
1. not in violation of the Act be- 2. in violation of the Act because
cause not involving unfair labor involving unfair labor practice
practice jI I
permissible only as long as ex- objectionable; employer ordered
ceptional conditions prevail to cease and desist from giving
I effect to it
employment conditions fixed for dubious validity and effect of the
the time being I employment conditions thus fixed.
Instances: (1) impasse of nego-
tiation between employer &
bargaining unions (Section II,
1, a, supra).
(2) no representative desig-
nated by majority of employees
(Section II, 1, b, supra).
III. Individual Employment Contract and Employee Status
It was pointed out above that the individual who enters into a rela-
tionship with an employer becomes integrated into the latter's business
organization and dependent upon the employer's orders. He has acquired
a peculiar set of rights and duties, granted and imposed by law. From
a status which was free of these coexistent rights and duties he has
changed to the status of an employee.68
68. The term "employee status" is well understood and commonly used. NLRB v.
Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); Sunshine Hosiery Mills, 1
N.L.R.B. 664 (1936); C. G. Conn. Ltd., 10 N.L.R.B. 498 (1938); NLRB v. Lightner
Publishing Corp. of Illinois, 113 F. (2d) 621 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); RosEAIM, op. cit.
supra note 26 at 47.
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In the "generic meaning" of the word, "an employee is a person who
is hired." 9 In order to hire a person, an individual employment con-
tract, the contract of hiring, must have been concluded. This was shown
to be true in the case when the employer complies with the Wagner Act,
when he bargains collectively and a collective agreement is reached.
The result we called the regular and perfect employee status. But this
was already shown to be equally true in the case when the employer
bargains individually, either in accordance with the Wagner Act or in
violation of its provisions. The first procedure was shown to lead to an
imperfect, the second to a defective employee status. In all of those
cases the employee, once hired, is at work; let us call his status regular.
The Wagner Act broadens the meaning of the term employee; for,
this term in the sense of the Act embraces two cases in which individuals
are actually not at work. They may either have ceased to work or have
been prevented by unfair labor practice from being hired and from
starting to work.
The NLRA provides that the term "employee" shall include "any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in tonnection
with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment."7°
This enlarged significance of the term "employee" refers, in the first
place to those who once had been hired and actually at work, but ceased
to continue working because of reasons mentioned above.
In the second place it is, however, possible that unfair labor practice
may be committed against those who are not yet hired, but offer their
services and are rejected because of their union activities. Such a rejection
constitutes discrimination. Against discrimination the NLRB may take
affirmative action and issue an order to the effect that such a rejected
offeror of services shall be treated as a quasi-employee.
In both cases the individuals concerned are not at work. To distin-
guish this status from the regular case in which the individual has been
hired and actually at work the status of employees out of work may
be termed the irregular employee status.
In summing up, the following different phases of the employee status
are to be distinguished:
1. Regular Employee Status: the employee is hired and at work.
a. The employment conditions and wages are determined by a col-
lective agreement. This is the perfect phase of the regular employee
69. Ros=ARB, op. cit. supra note 26 at 49.
70. NLRA § 2 (3), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (3). (Italics inserted).
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status under the NLRA. This phase of the status is perfect because
nothing remains to be done in order to comply with the policy of the
NLRA.
b. The employment conditions are not determined by collective agree-
ment but no unfair labor practice is involved.71 This is an imperfect
phase of the regular status. Employment conditions are fixed through
individual bargains only for the time being. Perfection of this status
through collective bargaining agreements is expected to be achieved as
soon as the conditions for this extraordinary status cease to continue.
c. The employment conditions are fixed by individual contracts in
violation of the Wagner Act.72 In such cases the status of the employee
is regular, since he has been hired and is at work. This phase of the
regular status is, however, defective because the ineffectiveness of the
bargained conditions which violate the NLRA and the uncertainty as
to the validity of the other conditions.
Regular Employee Status
hired








employment conditions employment conditions
not determined by col- brought about through
lective a g r e e m e n t, unfair labor practice
however no unfair la-
I bor practice involved I
I I I
section IV infra. correspondent with the Correspondent W i t h
left side of the above the right side of the
graph: Individual Bar- a b o v e graph: Indi-
gain. vidual Bargain.
2. Irregular Employee Status: This term refers to individuals who
are not working but are considered as being employees by operation of
71. Section II, 1 supra.
72. Section I, 2 supra.
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law. Two main groups are to be distinguished. First, the individual
concerned who is out of work has been hired by an individual employ-
ment contract. Since he is actually not working but his employee status
is continued by operation of law, his employee status may be called con-
structive. Secondly, there are cases in which an individual who never
has been hired by the employer in question is treated in the same way as
if he had been hired. This case may be termed quasi-employee status.
a. Within the constructive employee status, where the employee has
been hired but is actually out of work, the following distinction is to be
made:
(1) The employee's work has ceased in connection with a labor dis-
pute but not because of unfair labor practice. Let us consider the case
of employees who went on strike during a deadlock in negotiations.7 3
They retain the employee status and the right to vote in an election of
representatives. Since, however, no violation of law is involved, there
is no particular remedy in these cases. Therefore this situation may be
termed: constructive but not remediable employee status.
(2) In contrast to the above case, the employee's work has ceased
because of unfair labor practice. Where unfair labor practice is in-
volved the N'LRA provides remedies for the termination of such ir-
regularities. Therefore, this constructive status is termed remediable.
In these cases, moreover, an important distinction is to be made, namely,
whether or not the employment contract, once established through the act
of hiring, is terminated by discharge. If the employee is validly dis-
charged he is not only out of work but also out of his former contractual
relation. If his former employee status is to be restored because of un-
fair labor practice, it may be questionable74 whether he is for the time
being in a constructive or in a quasi-employee status.
73. See impasse case Section II, 1 (a) supra.
74. The Supreme Court, in a dictum in NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306
U. S. 240 (1939), has mentioned the possibility that the Board may issue an affirmative
order to reemploy a discharged employee. Valid discharge in the case of remediable con-
structive employee status must be based on violent or unlawful conduct on the part of the
employee who was discriminatorily discharged or went on strike in protest against unfair
labor practice on the part of the employer. On the other hand, in cases of serious offense
the Board has withheld orders for the reinstatement of the guilty individuals. If the reasons
justifying valid discharge completely coincide with those for withholding the reinstatement
orders of the Board the above stated subdivision would disappear. Then only one remediable
constructive employee status would remainin the cases where the employees out of work
are not guilty of any serious offense. Moreover, the main problem would be only to dis-
cover criteria for determining the seriousness of offenses which justify both the discharge
and the denial of the remedial reinstatement order.
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b. The quasi-employee status occurs, for instance, if someone who
offers service to the employer is rejected only because of union activity.
Discrimination with respect to hiring constitutes unfair labor practice,
which in turn calls for remedy. This remedy consists in that the in-
dividual who has been rejected is treated as if he had been hired. Hence
evolves the quasi-employee status.
Irregular Employee Status
not actually at work
constructive quasi-employee status
hired by an individual em- stranger who offered service
ployment contract but was rejected through un-
fair labor practice
not remediable remediable
no unfair labor prac- unfair practice is in-
tice involved volved
not discharged discharged 75
IV. The Regular Employee Status
In the two cases of the imperfect and the defective regular employee
status there is no collective agreement but an individual bargain in addi-
tion to an individual employment contract. The imperfect status where
no unfair labor practice is involved is supposed to be merely temporary.
In the case of the defective status the individual employment contract
results from unfair labor practice; this status cannot last either. The
implications of and the precedents referring to these two groups have
already been discussed.76
Therefore only the perfect regular employee status remains to be can-
vassed. In the case of this status the employment conditions of the in-
75. The dotted line shall express the possibility that the contractual relation of the
employee in the constructive status, who was validly discharged, is terminated and that
he, therefore, is in a similar position to a stranger in regard to reinstatement. In note 74
supra it should be noted, however, that discharge and reinstatement represent different
spheres of the law. Discharge resorts to the private sphere of the law of master and servant;
reinstatement is an instrument of the public law, as enacted in the NLRA.
76. See Section II, 1 and 2 supra.
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dividually hired employees are governed by collective agreements. These
employment conditions which are fixed through collective agreements
enter into and become an ingredient of the individual employment con-
tract. In other words, these employment conditions contained in col-
lective agreements entail a regulatory or "normative" effect upon the
individual employment contract. This normative effect of the collective
agreement is the salient point. It characterizes collective labor law. Full
explanation of this characteristic element is, however, not feasible within
the bounds of this article because it would necessarily include the dis-
cussion of the whole theory of the collective agreement." Therefore only
a brief outline of this problem can be presented here.
The various provisions of collective agreements are of a twofold
nature. 78 Partly, they have the effect of an ordinary agreement and con-
stitute obligations between the parties to them, i.e. between the employer
or the employers' association on the one side and the union representing
the employees on the other side. One of the most important obligations
to be found in the collective agreement is that of maintaining peace dur-
ing the term of the agreement. A strike or lockout in violation of such an
explicit or implied obligation contained in a collective agreement consti-
tutes a breach of contract and renders such a labor dispute illegal.79
Secondly, in contrast to other agreements the rights and duties which
the collective agreement creates between the immediate parties to it, do
not exhaust its legal effects. It also creates individual rights and duties
of the individuals employed in the bargaining unit. The individual em-
ployee is entitled to claim, for instance, paid vacation as provided for
in the collective agreement if he has complied with the requirements of
such a provision. On the other hand, the individual employee is obliged
to render service under the conditions and in the manner provided for
in the collective agreement. Thus, for instance, he may be obliged to
render service in cases of emergency outside the regular hours of work,
etc.8°
The different theories which are applied to explain this effect upon in-
77. The theory of the collective agreement is to be discussed more fully in a subsequent
article.
78. See Hoeniger, op. cit. supra note 16.
79. "There are many cases on record where unions were restrained from picketing or
conducting a strike in violation of the terms of agreements prohibiting strikes and stoppages.
There are . . . instances where employers have recovered damages by means of a repre-
sentative suit against the officers of the union." L RsmA", Tm Coixz=w LAnoR
AoREm=NT (1939) 180. See also Section III of the author's forthcoming article, Social
Peace and National Defense, to appear in THrouGHT, March 1941.
80. Lnmtu=, op. cit. supra note 79 at 102.
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dividual employees refer to custom and usage, to the rules of agency,
to the idea of ratification through the individual employees, to the idea
of an open offer of employment conditions, to be accepted by the in-
dividual employee or to the idea of third parties beneficiaries."' It is,
however, believed that these theories do not suffice to furnish a full
explanation. 2 Today in all cases governed by the Wagner Act or similar
state statutes a more adequate theory may be drawn from these statutes.
The normative effect is brought about through the majority rule and
the exclusiveness of representation of all employees of the appropriate
bargaining unit through the representatives chosen by the majority. 3
Such representation means that the collective agreements bargained by
the exclusive representatives are binding upon those whom they represent
exclusively. Even non-union members or individual employees belonging
to the minority union are bound by the terms of the agreement executed
by the exclusive representatives of the bargaining unit.84 Only a few
81. For a survey of the theories see, JAxoaE, CASES AND STATuTES ON LABOR LAW (1939)
759; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in Americatt Law (1931) 44 HAZv. L. REv. 572;
Hamilton, Individual Rights Arising from Collective Labor Contraits (1938) 3 Mo. L.
REv. 252; Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YA=n L. J. 195;
and the citations in note 15 supra. Illinois Central R:R. Co. v. Moore, 2 Labor Cases 845
(C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
82. Hamilton, op. cit. supra note 81 at 253-259, has explained the insufficiency of these
theories. In the conclusion of his article, at 273, he states: "The legal right of an in-
dividual to recover' damages for violation of a collective labor contract which injures the
employee is definitely established. No single principle that has been advanced to explain
the origin of this right adequately accounts for all its consequences. Nor is this surprising,
in view of the confusion which still shrouds the nature of the collective contracts from
which these rights are derived."
83. NLRA § 9 (a), 29 U. S. C. A. 159 (a) reads as follows: "Representatives desig-
nated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: . . . "
84. The workers who do the longshore work in the Pacific coast ports of the United
States for the companies which are members of the employers' associations named in the
decision constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, and the
International Longshoremen's and Warehouse Union is the exclusive representative of all
the workers in such unit. Shipowners' Association of the Pacific Coast, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002
(1938). Of the 12,860 longshoremen in the unit 9,557 have signed cards designating the
International Longshoremen's and Warehouse Union as their representative. Nobody doubts
that the collective agreement concluded between the employers' associations and the long-
shoremen's union has binding effect upon the employment relations of those 3,303 workers
who did not sign cards for the Longshoremen's union. See note 88 infra, and Yazoo & Miss.
Valley Ry. Co. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931); Rentschler v. Missouri Pac.
R. Co., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694 (1934).
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sentences from the Senate Committee Report suffice to show that it was
the explicit intention of the legislature that the regulatory or normative
effect of the collective agreement apply to the individual contracts of all
the employees of the unit concerned. Thus the Report says:
"There cannot be two or more basic agreements applicable to the workers
in a given unit .... Since the agreement made will apply to all, the minority
group and individual workers are given all the advantages of united action."8 ,5
The significance of the "normative" effect of the provisions of the
collective agreements consists in that they are by operation of law in-
gredients of the individual employment contracts of the employees of
the unit in question."6
Therefore we can conclude: In the case of the perfect regular em-
ployee status the employee is hired through an individual employment
contract but his wages and his employment conditions are determined
by the collective agreement bargained collectively for by the unit to
which he belongs; it does not matter whether he is a member of the
representing union or not. This effect is brought about through the
"normative" nature of the collective agreement which derives from the
statutory provisions referring to the majority rule and the exclusiveness
of representation. The American way of bringing about this effect differs
from the methods applied abroad. 7 Nowhere, however, can collective
bargaining develop successfully unless the normative part of the collec-
tive agreement be made binding upon non-union members by whatsoever
legal method. The main difference between the American way and the
methods employed abroad can be sketched as follows. Abroad, wherever
self-organization is well developed, collective bargaining precedes any
85. SEN. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
86. Many important questions derive from the theory of the normative effect of the
collective agreement. There is some doubt if through an individual contract less favorable
conditions than those contained in the collective agreement can be validly bargained. Hamil-
ton, op. cit. supra note 81 at 258. There seems to be, however, an opinion that better condi-
tions may be bargained individually. Notes 52-55 supra. If this be true, the collective agree-
ment would fix only minimum conditions. Granting better conditions to certain individuals
may sometimes result in discrimination against others. It is doubtlessly feasible to provide
in the collective agreement that better conditions shall no be individually bargained. In
this latter case the collective agreement would also fix maximum standard conditions.
87. Hamburger, The Extension of Collective Agreements to Cover Entire Trade and
Industries (1939) 40 INas_,ATIONAL LABoR REv. 153. Although this article covers a broader
topic, it also presents a comprehensive survey of laws creating the binding effect of col-
lective agreements upon individual contracts of employers or employees who are not mem-
bers of the bargaining association or union. See further: MrToDs oF CoLr.ABoRATIoN BE-
TWEEN PuBLic Aux"HonasIEs, WoRxERs' ORGA'izAzoNs An EiPLoYERS' AssociAToNs, INTER-
NATIONAL LABoR CoN-xxa.cE (26th Sess. Geneva, 1940) Collective Agreements with the Force
of Law, p. 112.
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governmental activity for the purpose of making the collective agreement
binding upon non-union members. After the collective agreement is
concluded, the parties to it may petition the government to declare this
agreement generally binding, i.e. binding upon non-members of the
representing union. The government or its agency is empowered by stat-
ute to issue such an order, if the parties to the agreement cover the large
majority of the employers and the employees concerned. In the United
States, a government agency's order is not necessarily required to estab-
lish the binding effect of the collective agreement upon non-members
of the representing union. The collective agreement is per se binding
upon such non-union members under two presuppositions: (1) that the
bargaining unit is appropriate, and (2) that the union or other bargain-
ing agency represents the majority of the unit in question. There may
be neither doubt nor dispute about the fact that these two conditions
are met. In such a situation governmental interference is not necessary
but is available. If, however, such doubt or dispute has arisen, the
NLRB can be petitioned for certification of the appropriate unit and of
the representation.88 In contrast to the methods applied abroad in these
cases the government agency steps in before the collective agreement is
concluded. A certifying order of the Board removes any doubt regard-
ing the fact that the non-members of the representing union are bound
by the terms of the collective agreement.8 9 In other words, in American
collective labor law the "normative" effect upon contracts of non-union
members can be brought about without governmental interference. How-
ever, when governmental interference becomes necessary, such inter-
ference precedes the collective bargain, while abroad the government
agency steps in after the collective agreement has been entered into.
Having now adumbrated the genesis and effects of the regular and
perfect employee status, we are able to turn to the question raised in
section I, B of this article. There we pointed out that the individual
employment contract necessary to produce this status in addition to
88. NLRA § 9 (b), (c), 29 U. S. C. A. § 159 (b), (c). The procedure in these cases
as provided for in Section 9 is distinct from that in cases of unfair labor practice as regu-
lated in Section 10 of the Act. A certification issued under Section 9 of the Act is not
reviewable by the courts. See A. F. of L., Longshoremen's Association v. NLRB, 308
U. S. 401 (1939); NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308 U. S. 413
(1939). The procedure for certification under Section 9 may be invoked in cases which
are to be classified under the perfect regular employee status where the employer is willing
to bargain collectively in good faith, but where there are doubts or disputes as to the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit or to the representation.
89. A. F. of L., Longshoremen's Association v. NLRB, 308 U. S. 401 (1939); Ship-
owners' Association of the Pacific Coast, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1938).
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the collective agreement denotes nothing more than the right to "hire
and fire." Moreover, we said, even this right to "hire and ifire" may be
further restricted through collective agreements, i.e. through mutual con-
sent, or by law, through the statutes preventing unfair labor practices.
First: The main instances90 of such restrictions based on collective
agreements may be mentioned. The closed shop proviso restricts the
selection of prospective employees to union members.91 Often such
clauses provide that the union furnish the employer with the required
number of competent workers. 2 If it is agreed that in lay-offs and re-
hiring seniority 3 shall govern, there are restrictions, voluntarily entered
into, qualifying the right to select and discharge employees. Further-
more, various clauses of collective agreements restrict or even exclude
the right of the employer to discharge employees without good and
sufficient reason. 4 In numerous provisions for the adjustment of griev-
ances 5 machinery for mediation or arbitration is established in cases
of dispute over the question of sufficient reason for discharge. A com-
plete analysis of the clauses affecting the right to "hire and fire" would
probably show that in actual practice this right is encumbered to a large
extent through collective agreements. Therefore we may state: the in-
dividual employment contract of today, even in the most regular cases,
where a collective agreement is voluntarily entered into and no govern-
mental interference is involved, is often characterized by these encum-
brances on the arbitrary power of the employer to select and to discharge
his employees. These encumbrances are based upon a voluntary agree-
ment. They result from cooperation between management and labor in
90. A complete analysis of the clauses purporting restrictions on the right to "hire
and fire" would overstep the bounds of this article.
91. LrIEn Lw, op. cit. supra note 79 at 203; RoTwEIN, LABOR LAw (1939) 94.
92. An interesting consequence of this restriction is that unemployed union members
who can accept employment in their regular occupation only if secured by the union, are
exempted from compulsory registration for work when they are claimants of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits. See Occupations of Applicants for Work (1939) Naw Yoan CITY
Ac=IE FILE oF NEw YORK STATE EmPLOYYNET SERVICE iV.
93. Seniority Provisions in Collective Agreements (1938) 47 MoNTHLY LABOR REV. 1250.
94. LEBmr.z.r, op. cit. supra note 79 at 86. A comparative study of labor law would
reveal that there is a tendency throughout the world to restrain the right of arbitrary dis-
charge.
95. "It will be difficult, as a practical matter, for management to refuse to concede to
employees the right of appeal of discharge complaints through a formal grievance proce-
dure." Bergen, Management Prerogatives (1940) 53 HARv. Bus. REv. 280. See also Settle-
ments of Grievances under Union Agreements (1940) 50 MoNTHLY LABOR REV. 286.
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a particularly important field. Their tendency is to create an interest
similar to a right to and tenure of the job.
Second: The NLRA itself imposes restrictions upon the employer's
right to hire and to fire. These are embodied in Section 8 (3) of the Act
which makes it an unfair labor practice "by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization." Violation of this provision has a peculiar effect.
It affects the employee status. In the case of discriminatory discharge the
regular employee status converts into the irregular status. The employee
remains employee within the scope of Section 2 (3) of the NLRA. Thus
the constructive and remediable employee status is created. When the
employer is shown to have discriminated against persons offering their
services, the policy of the NLRA is to protect those persons by granting
them a quasi-employee status. So unfair labor practice itself creates
new forms of employer-employee relations. These types of the irregular
employee status will be discussed in detail.
[To be continued]
